

E# 808

Doc. No. 2593D-2

Page 1

(Item No. 3)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)  
To: Washington  
July 31, 1941  
Purple (CA)

#432 (Part 1 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with the military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular #1300. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.

2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.

a - Not available.

NOTE: The system used in this message is considered to be of the highest type of secret classification used by the Japanese Foreign Office. It used the CA code transposed according to J-19 keys and the resulting transposed code was then enciphered in the purple machine. This is the first solution of such a system that has been effected.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

(Item No. 3)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)  
To: Washington  
July 31, 1941  
Purple (CA)

#433 (Part 2 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into

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From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

July 31, 1941

Purple (CA)

#433 (Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia because of her own military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions.

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.



2593-D-2-1  
(Item No. 3)

Ex 808

秘

東京通信 (外務大臣)

ワシントン通信

一九四一年八月十六日

第 (0 A)

第三三三編 (五ノ一)

(ベルリン電報第七〇八)

目下「ロシヤ」ト交戦シ居ル爲メ我方ノ援助ヲ求セ  
ル獨逸ニ對シ我方ノトル可キ態度ニ付時折リ貴下ヨ  
リ種々ナル意見ヲ申述シ來レリ。

幾度ノ反覆シ重ネ、爲メニ我々ノ程度ノ倦怠ヲ貴下ニ  
與ヘル恐レアルモ軍部ト會議セル結果帝國政府ノ政  
策及見解ヲ茲ニ披瀝スベシ、故ツテ今後共之レニヨ  
リ行動サレ度シ

一 七月二日午前ノ内閣會議ニ於テ我々今後ノ政策ニ  
關スル決定ノ大略ヲ採擇シレリ。

此ニ同狀第一三九〇號ニテ通牒済ミナルモノヲ以  
テ來政府ハ該政策實現ニアラニル努力ヲ擧ヒ今尙擧  
ヒツ、アル。

ニ 文部事務ハ概ニ四ケ年ノ長期ニ亘リ、帝國政府ノ  
一貫的傾向、特ニ軍部ノ傾向ハ是迄其ノ能力ノ大

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

2593-D-2-2  
(Itan. No. 3)

部分ヲ今事態ノ修補ニ資シ、且ツ努力セリ、今  
ヤ我々ハ南北ヨリノ新事態ニ直面セリ。之ニ對處  
センガ爲メ總力戦ニ對スル我國ノ完全武裝ハ重且  
大ナル理由ガアル。

●二〇七〇 入手不可能

註

コノ電報ニ用ヒラレタ憲立法ハ日本外務省ニヨッ  
テ用ヒラレテキル秘密憲立法中ノ最高ノモノト思  
ハレル、ソレハJ I 19ノ鍵ニヨツテ0 A符號ヲ  
置キ換ヘソノ結果置キ換ヘラレタ符號ヲ次ニ紫色  
機軸ヲ附號ニ組立テタモノデアル。  
コノ機軸憲立法ガ効果的ニ解讀サレタノハコレガ  
最初デアル。

2593-D-2-3  
(Item No. 3)

東京府 (外務大臣)

ワシントン 宛

一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 / 七月三十一日

機 (U A)

第三三三番 (四ノ二)

(ワシントン宛電報第七〇八)

貴乙モ亦我方ノ此ノ立場ヲ充分了解シラル様ナリ  
東京駐在御乙大使館々員へ此ノ事ヲ通知セルモ  
御乙本國へ彼等程我國ノ立場ヲ知悉シ居ラザルモノ  
ト思フ

日本ト第三國トノ商業的經濟的關係へ美米兩國ノ  
主導ニ依リ損失非僅ナル急進ヲ告グ我方トシテモ  
モハヤ是以上我慢シ得ズ從ツテ帝國へ自己生存ノ  
爲前方ノ原料ヲ運搬スル地位ヲ保ル必要アリ、  
我帝國へ一見民レルカノ如ク見セカケテキル波瀾  
ナル飛越ノ如ク行動セル米業ノ指導ト關係ニヨリ  
テ續リナサレル處ノ困難ヲク顕化サレツ、アル包  
圍ノ以テ切斷スベキ手段ヲ直チニ採用セザルベカ



2573-D-2-4  
(Item No. 3)

ラズ。我方が領印度支那ニ軍事基地ヲ獲得シ其  
ノ領土ニ我軍ヲ進駐セシメタルハ此レガ故ナリ  
意テ申ス、此ノ處極東ニ在リ。露國ハ云フニ及ズ  
米英ヲシテ太平洋ニ於ケル通行ヲ余難ナクセシメ  
御ツテ獨乙ニ役立ツベキナリ、今ヤ日米關係ハ加  
速度的ニ往々惡化ヲ進リツ、アル。此レハ米國ニ  
對シ如何ニ打撃ナルヤヲ示ス

2593-D-2-5  
(Item No. 3)

穩

東京（外務大臣）發

ワシントン宛

一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月三十一日

衆（G A）

第四三三號

（四ノ第三部）

（ペルリン宛發信第七〇八號）

勿論朝鮮戦争ハ吾等ニ北方問題解決ノ絶好ノ機會ヲ與ヘタ。コノ事實ヲ利用スベク準備ヲ進メテ居ルコトハ事實デアル。併シ準備ノ必要アルノミナラズ、吾人ハワマク機會ヲ逃スベナラス。我が帝國ノ直面セル現實ノ事態ニ鑑ミ、コレハ容易ニ理解セラルベシ、若シ朝鮮戦争ガ余リニ迅速ニ進行スルカラバ、我帝國ハ必然的ニ、何等ノ有様ナル一戦ノ行動ヲ取ル余裕ヲ有シナイデアラウ。

5 本官ハ獨逸人ハ我國未交渉ニ望カ不慣ナルコトヲ知レルモ、我等ハ是非英米山ヲ沙限セシメス様希望シ、且支那事變ヲ解決センコトヲ希望シタ。コノ目標ニ向ヒ吾人ハ拮据シテ居タ。其ノ結果吾等ハ日本帝國ノ決意ハ深刻ナリトノ情エ難キ印象ヲ與ヘ、米國ヲシテ朝鮮問題ニ突入ヲ抑止セル事

2593-D-2-6  
(Item No. 3)

實ニ反旗セントスル人へ反旗シテモ構ヘナイ。

吾等ニハ激熱セリト思ヘンタル時ニ、且ツ日獨  
向ニ完全ナル信賴アリトノ推定、下ニコノ會談ヲ  
開始セルコトハ理解セラルベキデアル。コノ事ニ  
關シテハ、當方ニハ激モ望マシカラス時ニ獨逸ハ  
自身ノ軍事的都合カラ露國重ト開戦シタノデハナ  
イカ、今ヤ吾等ハ又露國變ヲ居衣セズベナラスノ  
ミナラズ、南方並ビニ北方ノ新ラシキ統戰ニ逼ル  
ベナラナイガ、コレハ全く不便ナルコトデアル。

2593-D-2-7  
(Item No. 3)

秘

東京（外務大臣）發

ワシントン宛

一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月三十一日

柴（O A）

第四三三號（四ノ第四部）（ベルリン宛發信第七〇八號）

吾人ハ獨逸ト協カスベク最善ノ努力ヲ拂ヒツツアリ。獨逸ハコレヲ知リ、吾人ノ行動ヲ理解スベキデアル。

6、茲テ三國條約ノ根本精神實現ノタメ、東京ベルリン間ノ協力ノ形式ハ各國ソノ行動ニ於テ或程度ノ柔軟性ヲ有スベキデアル。本官ノ言ハントスルトコロハ、眞ノ協力ハ必ズシモ行動ノ完全ナル一致ヲ意味シナイコトヲ銘々諒解スベキダト云フコトデアル。換言スレバ、吾人ハ相互ニ信頼スベキデアリ、一個ノ全体ノ目的ニ向ヒ努力シツ、モ、ヨキ判斷ノ範圍内デハ自己ノ自由裁量ヲ用フベキデアル。

斯クノ如ク我帝國ノ採ル一切ノ方策ハ三國條約ノ目的ノ成功ヲ招來スベキ決意ニ基クベキデアル。コレガ事實デアルト云フコトハ勸諭ノ發布ニヨリテモ證明セラレル。吾人ハ絶エズコノ目的實現ノタメニ

2593-D-2-8  
(Item No. 3)

活動シテ居ル。今ヤ現下ノ恐ルベキ緊急時ニ際シテ  
ハ確カニ如何ナル輕卒、不用意致ハ早急ナル行動ニ  
從事シテ居ルノ余裕ハナイノデアル。

ローマへ送信セラレタシ。

ワシントンへ送信セリ。



Doc. 2593 cert.

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸 軍 省 参 謀 本 部

情 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、  
添附數通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ入力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部付大佐

CARTER, W. CLARKE  
カーター・ダヴリウ・クラーク